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This paper explores the role of marriage when markets are incomplete so that individuals
cannot diversify their idiosyncratic labor income risk. Ceteris paribus, an individual would
prefer to marry a “hedge” (i.e. a spouse whose income is negatively correlated with her own)
as it raises her expected utility. The presence of love, however, complicates the picture. If
love is very persistent, for example, and the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income is
early, then those who in fact married hedges are the ones most likely to be caught short with
too little love in order to save a marriage in the event of an adverse shock. Consequently,
under these conditions individuals who are good hedges for one another are more likely to
marry one another, although once married, they will be more likely to divorce. In contrast,
if love is ﬂeeting and the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income is predominantly later,
then those who in fact marry hedges will in fact be less likely to subsequently divorce.
Evidence is provided to distinguish which of these alternative scenarios is in support of
these aspects of the decision to stay married. Additional hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of
diﬀerences in the expected means and volatilities of partners’ incomes are also derived from
the theory and tested.
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Within his bending sickle’s compass come,
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom:
... W. Shakespeare, Sonnet 116
1 Introduction
In his seminal work on the economics of marriage, Gary Becker [1975] argued that the
fundamental reason for marriage is the creation of one’s own children, as “Sexual gratiﬁca-
tion, cleaning, feeding and other services can be purchased,” but one’s own children cannot
be. Importantly, he introduced broad economic concepts into the analysis and existence
of marital institutions. He also emphasized the role the marriage market plays in sorting
individuals based on their traits: positive assortive mating would rely on these traits being
complements, whereas negative assortive mating would require these traits to be substitutes.
In contrast, several economists have also considered the pure risk-sharing elements of
marriage.1 For instance, Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) analyze the gains from marriage from
risk sharing when expected lifetimes are uncertain. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) explore the
marriage market from the perspective of how families in diﬀerent Indian villages arranged
marriages in order to oﬀset weather-related risk. Recently, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) ﬁnd
further evidence that women migrate to distant villages to marry as a means of family
risk-sharing.2
The broader risk-sharing literature, however, contains a vast amount of evidence against
complete risk sharing and complete markets. At the macro-level, Backus, Kehoe and Kyd-
1Indeed, some would argue that in societies where the means of intertemporal consumption smoothing
are limited, children themselves would provide a type of income insurance for old age or disability. This
paper does not consider the use of children for this role.
2See Bergstrom (1996) and Weiss (1997) for a broader survey of the literature on the economics of family
creation and destruction.
1land (1992) demonstrate incomplete cross-country risk sharing, while, among others, Hess
and Shin (1998, 2000) ﬁnd evidence of limited across-region risk sharing within the United
States. At the micro-level, Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Hess and Shin (1999) pro-
vide evidence against complete markets / aggregate risk-sharing across households within
a country, while Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1996) demonstrate incomplete risk sharing
across generations even within a given family.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role economic factors such as risk sharing
play in the decision to get married and stay married, and how the presence of love interacts
with these economic motives. In the simple model presented here, individuals are faced with
randomly ﬂuctuating labor incomes which they can smooth intertemporally by borrowing or
saving at a risk-free rate, exactly as in the permanent income hypothesis. However, there
is assumed to be no formal market to diversify idiosyncratic risk to income.3 Marriage,
whereby two individuals consume out of common resources, does provide an opportunity to
partly oﬀset the idiosyncratic shocks to their income.4 Partly simply refers to the fact that
an ideal mate would be a complete hedge, whereby the partner’s income would be perfectly
negatively correlated with one’s own income. Still, ceteris paribus, an individual will have
higher expected utility by sharing resources with a partner whose shocks to income are less
than perfectly correlated.
While the desire to oﬀset idiosyncratic labor risk could be a powerful inducement to
marry, it is also the case that other issues also matter when it comes to marrying and staying
3A good reason for why labor income risk is not fully insurable is moral hazard, for if labor income risk
were to be completely insurable this would provide a strong disincentive to work. See Chami and Fisher
(1996) for a more general treatment of how incomplete markets can give rise to non-market arrangements
for co-insurance.
4Of course, polygamy would do an even better job of providing this insurance. As we do not observe
many societies where this is operable or legal, one can only suppose that “love” faces adverse technological
issues when there are more than two individuals in a marriage. For instance, Becker (1975) argues that a
reason why we do not observe several men married to the same woman is that it would be hard to identify
the father, although he admits that this would not explain why one man would not marry several women.
Recent advances in DNA testing would also lessen this reason. Becker explains the lack of polygamy rather
by diminishing returns from adding additional members to a marriage, and hence, ceteris paribus, additional
members would rather form their own two-person union rather than be the third member of an existing one.
2married. I simply term this factor “love”. In the model, love is an additively separable,
exogenous non-pecuniary endowment good, which two individuals mutually share. It is,
for good or bad, subject to ﬂuctuations (both again shared). As will be shown, how long
initial love can be expected to last, crucially eﬀects the way in which observed economic
characteristics can be used to predict whether a marriage will succeed or end in divorce.
A number of strong predictions about the relationship between mates who are good
economic hedges and their ability to get married, as well as stay married, are implied by
the model. First, two individuals are more likely to marry each other the better hedges they
are. Second, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty about shocks to income is
primarily early in life, the model predicts that married couples who are better hedges for one
another are more likely to divorce. The reason lies in the substitution between consumption
insurance and love in the model. Operationally, while both consumption insurance and love
will cause a couple to marry, if love is long-lasting and future income uncertainty is low,
only love will keep them together in the long run. In contrast, if love is a short-lived
phenomenon and the resolution of uncertainty to agents’ income is primarily in the future,
then married couples who are better hedges actually stay married longer. Because couples
will ﬁnd less love on average (since love is mean reverting), the costs of being married to a
poor hedge will rise in the future. Importantly, the impact of a couple’s predicted income
correlation on marital duration allows one to infer the persistence characteristics of love
and the importance of future income uncertainty.
The cases in which potential marriage partners have diﬀerent expected levels of incomes
and income uncertainties are also considered. Additional theoretical predictions are derived
and tested. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the model is presented
in Section 2, and four propositions are derived that link marital-income characteristics to
the decision to get married and stay married. Section 3 provides a test of the propositions
concerning the eﬀects of these marital income characteristics on marital duration. I conclude
3in Section 4.
2 The Model
The model has three time periods: 0, 1 and 2. In period 0, two individuals, i and j, randomly
meet and decide whether or not to get married. They learn the expected correlation of their
incomes, ρij, and observe how much they initially love each other in period 1, α1, where
ρij and α1 are assumed to be independent.5 Unfortunately, initial love, α1, is only a noisy,
though unbiased, signal of how much they will love each other in period 2, α2.
Each individual also learns in period 0 the present value of their expected lifetime
earnings, i.e. their permanent income, yi.6 A fraction θ of this income is earned in period
1, while the remaining (1 − θ) fraction is earned in period 2. Each kth individual (k = i,j)
has a random income error in each period (t), tk, so that actual income in each period is
yk = yk + tk, where E0(1k) = 0, E1(2k) = 0 and var(ti) = σ2
k. To keep the expected
present discounted value of income ﬁxed at yk as of period 1, regardless of when it was
earned, I assume that each agent receives θyk in period 1 and (1 − θ)(1 + r)yk in period
2 where (1 + r) is the gross rate of return. Individuals receive labor income in periods 1
and 2, yet decide whether or not to marry in period 0. Further, to keep the model simple,
I assume that agents have only one opportunity to marry. Of course, if the couple decide
to marry then they will continue to share resources evenly. I discuss the terms of marriage
adopted in the paper below.
In period 1, all individuals observe the realized shocks to their incomes, 1k, and each
consumes cM
1k if married, and cNM
1k if unmarried, k = i,j. Depending on the timing of
income, θ, each agent will borrow or save at the gross rate of return (1+r). In period 2, if
the agents are married, they learn how much they will love each other in period 2. Love is
5In cases where it is clear the notation applies to both individuals, I drop the i and j subscriptions.
6All variables are per-person.
4assumed to follow the exogenous process:
α2 = δα1 + (1 − δ)α + ν (1)
where ν is a random disturbance unknown to either agent in period 1, but learned by both in
period 2. Namely, Et(ν) = 0, for t = 0,1, and where ν has the cumulative density function
F(ν).7 The parameter δ controls for the extent to which love is temporary (δ → 0), i.e.
it is mean reverting to α, or permanent (δ → 1).8 After learning ν, but before observing
their second-period income shocks, 2i and 2j, couples decide whether to divorce or stay
married. After this decision, each consumes cD
2k and cM
2k, respectively. If they have never
married, each simply consumes cNM
2k in period 2. The timing of events in the model is listed
in Table 1.
The model’s marital institutions are as follows: First, if i and j are married, they
consume out of their joint resources, including both income and savings, and maximize
their joint welfare for as long as they are married. Within marriage, each individual’s
utility is weighted equally. Second, if i and j marry in period 1, they each receive α1. If
they do not marry, they receive α1 = 0. If the couple marries in period 1 and subsequently
divorces in period 2, the individuals receive no love (α2 = 0) in period 2 and they must pay
the utility cost φ to divorce. Third, divorce agreements are assumed to split marital savings
evenly, as well as all expected future labor earnings evenly.9 If the couple stay married they
then receive α2.
7Love and all income characteristics are assumed to be independent.
8For the case of δ = 1, Katarina Juselius provided an alternative explanation for this assumption: namely,
that individuals’ love for one another is a random walk, and what is important for staying married is that
their love be “cointegrated”– see Johansen and Juselius (1992).
9This latter assumption is helpful in two regards. First, it equates the marginal utility of consumption
across partners in the ﬁrst period. Second, it makes the probability of divorce, conditional on marriage,
independent of the expected level of individual resources.
52.1 The Two-Period Problem
If i and j do not marry, they individually choose the path of consumption and savings that








for k = i,j and 0 < β ≤ 1, (2)
subject to their budget constraints:
c1k + sk = θyk and c2k = (1 + r)(sk + (1 − θ)yk) for k = i,j (3)
If i and j marry, they choose the path of consumption and the decision to remain married
or divorce later to maximize their welfare. As long as they remain married, they maximize
their joint welfare out of joint resources. Otherwise, as stated above, they evenly split
their resources (current savings and expected future income) and maximize their individual
utility. Let D refer to the decision in period 2 whether to divorce, and P be the probability
that they divorce (having been married), so that (1−P) is the probability that they do not
divorce and thus remain married. 10 The probability of divorce, P, the decision to marry
and the subsequent decision to stay married or divorce are endogenously determined below.















10Given this setup, since P is endogenous but does not depend on a consumption-choice variable - see
expressions (12)to(14) - the expected marginal utility of consumption is the same whether one remains
married or divorces. Furthermore, given the certainty equivalent speciﬁcation of the utility function assumed,
the results are unaﬀected if expression (4) is changed so that in period one, individuals i and j jointly
maximize their expected welfare even when they are divorced in period 2.
















k=i,j sk + (1 − θ)( yij + i)) if i and j Divorce
β−1(
P
k=i,j(sk + (1 − θ)(yij +
P
k=i,j k)) − c2j if i and j Remain Married
where yij is their average joint expected income, yij = (1/2)
P
k=i,j yk.
2.2 The Second-Period Consumption Problem and the Divorce Decision
The model is solved recursively. In period 2, after i and j learn the degree of their new love
for one another, α2, and then make the decision to stay married or not. To simplify the
calculation, I assume that the utility function is quadratic, U(c) = c − (b/2) c2, which pro-
vides certainty equivalence. In addition, I assume that the discount factor is the reciprocal
of the interest rate factor, β−1 = (1 + r).




sNM + (1 − θ)yk
i
k = i,j. (6)
If a couple was married in period 1, yet, having learned ν, decides to divorce and pay the




sD + (1 − θ)( yij + k)
i
(7)
where sD = (1/2) ·
P
k=i,j sM
k . Recall that if divorced, i and j equally divide total savings,
P
k=i,j sM
k , and fully share their expected future labor incomes.
If i and j are married and choose not to get divorced (denoted in period 2 by ‘M’) they
7maximize their equally weighted, joint welfare:
max
{c2k}







c2k = β−1 X
k=i,j
(sM
k + (1 − θ)yk). (9)
The ﬁrst-order condition is for the married individuals to equate their marginal utilities,
U0(cM
2i ) = U0(cM
2j), so that the consumption and utility levels are:
cM
2i = cM




k + (1 − θ)yk

. (10)
Notice from (7) and (10) that E(cM
2k) = E(cD
2k) for k = i,j. This result is a property of the
sharing rules for divorce and marriage and the fact that divorce is assumed to have only a
utility cost but not a ﬁnancial cost.
The decision to divorce hinges on whether U(cM
2k) < U(cD
2k) for either k = i,j. It can be
written in terms of the second-period common shock to the level of love, ν, that will result
in divorce:
(11)
Divorce if: ν < −
 
δα1 + (1 − δ)α + φ + (1 − θ)2β−1ζσ2





δα1 + (1 − δ)α + φ + (1 − θ)2β−1ζΦ2σ2
i (1 − Ω)

Remain Married: Otherwise,
where ζ = β−1(b/2), Ω = ((1+2ρijΦ+Φ2)/4), ρij is the correlation of their income shocks,
and Φ is the ratio of their standard deviations, Φ = σj/σi. Four important aspects of the
model are worth noting. First, Ω provides a measure of the hedging beneﬁt since as ρ rises,
married individuals become worse hedges for one another and Ω rises. For example, if Φ = 1
8so that both agents have the same expected income volatility, then Ω = 1 when incomes are
perfectly positively correlated, ρij = +1, and Ω = 0 when incomes are perfectly negatively
correlated, ρij = −1. Second, if θ = 1 so that all income is earned in period 1, then economic
factors play no direct role in the period-2 decision to divorce or stay married.11 Third, if
δ = 0 so that all ﬂuctuations in love are temporary, a couple’s initial level of love (α1) has no
eﬀect on its decision whether or not to divorce. Finally, due to the assumption that couples
share lifetime expected labor resources even if they divorce, consumption-utility levels will
be the same regardless of whether the couple divorces or stays married. Hence, the decision
to stay married will not depend directly on labor income diﬀerentials.
Given the couples’ parameters (α1, ρij, yk, σk, for k = i,j) and the technology and
institutional parameters (δ, θ, and φ ), ˆ ν is deﬁned as the worst shock to their love that i
and j can receive and still remain married. Since, in general, individuals will have diﬀerent
expected income volatilities, Φ 6= 1, each individual within a marriage will have a diﬀerent
threshold point. Thus, we must consider the highest threshold (i.e. the greatest lower bound





dF(ν) = F(ˆ ν), (12)
where:
ˆ νi = −
 
δα1 + (1 − δ)α + φ + (1 − θ)2β−1ζσ2
i (1 − Ω)
 (13)
ˆ νj = −(δα1 + (1 − δ)α + φ + (1 − θ)2β−1ζσ2
i Φ2(1 − Ω)). (14)
Notice that for δ > 0 as α1 increases, ˆ ν falls, and the probability of divorce falls. In other
words, couples that love each other more in period 1 are more likely to remain married.
Similarly, as agents become better hedges for one another, ρ falls and Ω falls, which causes
11However, economic factors will have an eﬀect, indirectly, as love may be substituted for economic factors
in period 1.
9ˆ ν to fall. This results in an decreased probability of divorce.
2.3 The First-Period Consumption Problem and the Decision to Marry
Having solved the period-2 consumption problem and the decision to stay married or di-
vorced, I now solve the period-1 consumption problem. In period 1, both i and j know each
others economic characteristics and initial level of love they have for each other, α1. Below,
I examine their consumption and welfare levels over periods 1 and 2 under both marriage
and non-marriage conditions to solve their decision to get married.
If i and j do not marry, they individually maximize (2), subject to (3). As I have
assumed that the discount factor equals the inverse of the interest rate factor, the optimality
condition is that U0(cNM
1i ) = E1U0(cNM
2i ). Once the period-1 income shock is observed, the





















Hence, prior to learning their period-1 income shocks, the expected welfare levels for indi-
viduals i and j if they do not marry are, respectively:
E(WNM
i ) = yi(1 − ψyi) − σ2
i (ψθ2 + (1 − θ)2ζ) (17)
E(WNM
j ) = yj(1 − ψyj) − σ2
i Φ2(ψθ2 + (1 − θ)2ζ), (18)
where ψ = (b/2)/(1 + β).
If they do marry, they maximize (4), subject to (5). The solution for the consumption
path cM
1k and cM
2k, k = i,j, is to equate the marginal utility across partners at period 1 and
10to equate the marginal utility of consumption at period 1 with the expected marginal utility
of consumption at period 2:
cM



































According to equations (19) and (20), each individual in a marriage smoothes his or her
consumption across time, knowing that all labor resources earned in period 1, all marital
savings, and all expected future labor income is shared if they divorce. Notice that complete
risk sharing is obtained within marriages.
The expected utility from marrying, conditional on learning α1, yk, and σk for k = i,j,
and ρij is:
E(WM
i ) = α1 + β
h
−φ · P + (1 − P) ·





+yij(1 − ψyij) − σ2
i





j ) = α1 + β
h
−φ · P + (1 − P) ·





+yij(1 − ψyij) − Φ2σ2
i











k ) ≥ E(WNM
k ) for both k=i,j.
Do not marry if: Otherwise.
We now have the model’s main prediction for the factors which aﬀect the likelihood of
11marriage.
Proposition 1 Ceteris paribus, two individuals are less likely to marry:
• The more correlated their earnings are.
• The greater the diﬀerence in their expected earnings is.
• The greater the diﬀerence in the uncertainty about their individual earnings is.
Proof: From expressions (22) and (23), the expected welfare from marriage decreases as ρij
increases, while the welfare from not marrying does not depend on ρij. Also, since marriages
must be mutually agreed to, the binding decision to marry is on the individual with higher
expected income and lower variance. Without loss of generality, denote individual i such
that ˆ νi > ˆ νj. As her potential partner’s (j0s) income uncertainty rises (Φ > 1) and expected
income falls relative to hers (yj < yij), from expression (22) we see this lowers the expected
welfare from individual i marrying individual j. Ceteris paribus, they are less likely to
receive a love shock that compensates them for their loss, which makes the probability of
their getting married decrease.
Based on the decision to marry and the welfare from not marrying, which are derived
from expressions (17), (18), (22), and (23), Proposition 1 follows directly. First, the more
positively correlated individuals’ incomes are, the poorer the individuals are at providing in-
come insurance for one another, which reduces the expected welfare from marriage. Second,
if individuals i and j are identical in all respects, except mean income, one must wonder
why the individual with a higher income would ever agree to marriage.12 The answer is
that without a great deal of mutual love, she will not, and the likelihood of such a high
level of mutual love becomes less and less likely the bigger the gap in expected incomes.
As a result, they will be less likely to marry. Finally, the implication that a greater dif-
ference in earnings-uncertainty lowers the likelihood of marriage follows exactly as in the
case of greater expected-earnings diﬀerentials: the individual with lower uncertainty must
be compensated with higher levels of love in order to engage in the marriage, which makes
marriage a less likely outcome.
12One can think of this as: ‘Why would a multi-millionaire want to marry you?’
12Interestingly, one can see from Proposition 1 that the introduction of love allows indi-
viduals to marry spouses who may not improve their economic outlook. For example, it
allows one to marry someone who is a poor hedge, who has a lower or more volatile income,
and who may have fewer resources.13 Of course, whether or not this results in longer-lasting
marriages depends on the willingness for individuals to substitute economic characteristics
for initial love. It will also depend upon how long the love between the couple is expected
to last, δ, and the fraction of labor income that is earned in the future, θ.
2.4 The Divorce Decision
Now that the properties governing whether two individuals will get married have been
established, I examine the properties that govern whether they will stay married or divorce.
The result depends critically on the persistence of love (δ) and the fraction of risk to income
that is resolved in the future (Φ). In order to keep the results as transparent as possible, I
proceed through this analysis by inspecting one mechanism at a time.
2.4.1 The Impact of Income Correlation on the Probability of Divorce
In this subsection I analyze the impact of more correlated incomes on the decision to stay
married or divorce. To isolate this feature, I assume that individuals have the same mean
incomes (yi = yj) and variances (Φ = 1). In this case, individuals i and j will have the
same threshold-love levels, referred to as ˆ ν. As of period 1, an increase in ρij aﬀects the
probability of divorce as follows:
dF(ˆ ν)
dρij













13For example, the existence of love will tend to make the correlation of income across spouses more
positive, which is consistent with Becker and Murphy’s (1998) view that love induces additional positive
assortive mating. Their reasoning is that love waters down the economic incentives for marriage, producing
segregation and limiting the extent to which “low quality” mates can bribe “high quality” mates to marry
them. The model does suggest, however, that the existence of love will lead to more negative assortive
mating based on income volatility and mean income characteristics.
13This total eﬀect takes into account that individuals must still ﬁnd it incentive compatible to
get married in the ﬁrst place, E(WM
k ) ≥ E(WNM
k ) for k = i,j. The term in square brackets
is the total eﬀect of a change in ρij on the threshold love shock ˆ ν. The are two eﬀects. The
ﬁrst term is the direct eﬀect that a change in ρij has on the threshold love shock. The
second term is the eﬀect of an increase in ρij inducing a substitution towards more initial
love, which will indirectly aﬀect the threshold level of love in period 2. However, having
arrived at period 2, love and hedging have the following eﬀects on the shock level that love
can withstand, ˆ ν:
∂ˆ ν/∂α1 = −δ < 0 (25)
∂ˆ ν/∂ρij = (1 − θ)2ζβ−1σ2
i /2 > 0 (26)
Using expressions (26) and (25) and solving for the “love-correlation” trade-oﬀ, ∂α1/∂ρij, by







β−1(1 − θ)2ζ − δ
 
θ2ψ + (1 − θ)2ζ(1 − P(ˆ ν))





The ﬁrst term inside the square brackets is positive and reﬂects the costs of having a partner
who is a poorer hedge (i.e., higher ρij) in period 2. This term goes to 0 as θ approaches 1,
since the role of a hedge is no longer needed in the future if all permanent income uncertainty
has been resolved in period 1. The second term inside the square brackets is negative and
reﬂects the fact that having a partner who is a poorer hedge makes an individual require
more love in period 1 to get married. The fact that being a poorer hedge “crowds-in” initial
love will be more important for keeping marriages together as initial love becomes more
14persistent (δ rises) and there is less uncertainty to future income (θ is low).
Proposition 2
• Case A: An increase in the correlation of couples’ individual incomes, ρij, will raise
the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently low and the fraction
of income that is earned early in life, θ, is suﬃciently low.
• Case B: An increase in the correlation of couples’ individual incomes (ρij) will lower
the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently high and the
fraction of income that is earned early in life, θ, is suﬃciently high.
Proof: The sign of (27) depends on the term in square brackets. Denote this expression
in square brackets ω. At the extreme values of θ and δ, if δ = 0 then ω > 0, if θ = 0 then
ω > 0, while if θ = 1, then ω ≤ 0. ω is decreasing in both θ and δ, namely,





β(1 − P(ˆ ν))




θ2ψ + (1 − θ)2ζ(1 − P(ˆ ν))
1 + βδ(1 − P(ˆ ν))
!
< 0,
so that the probability of divorce falls as either δ or θ rise.
In Case A, since initial love is temporary and there is still a demand for income insurance
in period 2, couples may marry in period 1, despite having highly correlated incomes, only
if they start out with a very high initial amount of love. However, because this love is
not likely to last and couples still prefer good income insurance, they will be more likely to
divorce than couples that started out as good hedges for one another. In contrast, in Case B
all that matters in the decision to divorce or stay married is how much love existed initially,
since most income uncertainty has been resolved by period 2. Those who are better hedges
tend to have less love initially and hence are more susceptible to a love shortfall in period
2 as long as love is suﬃciently persistent.
2.4.2 The Impact of Income Uncertainty on the Probability of Divorce
While the discussion so far has focused on the correlation of the partners’ incomes, one
can repeat the exercise considering individuals who are the same in all respects except
15income volatility. The intuition is as follows: if a couple diﬀers greatly in the volatility of
its partners’ incomes, one must consider why the individual with stable income married the
individual with the volatile one. Similar to the case of two individuals who marry despite
not being good hedges for one another, the answer lies in the fact that the low-volatility
individual must have been compensated with a large initial level of mutual love. If, as in
Case A, initial love is transitory and a large fraction of permanent income is still to be
earned, then this couple is more likely to divorce because there will not be enough love in
the future to compensate the individual with lower income risk (i.e., the individual with a
lower volatile income will fall short ﬁrst). In contrast, in Case B, if initial love is persistent
and little income is left to be earned in the future, then the couple will be less likely to run
short of love and divorce.
Proposition 3
• Case A: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual income uncertainties,
Φ, will raise the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently low
and the fraction of income that is earned early in life, θ, is suﬃciently low.
• Case B: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual income uncertainties,
Φ, will lower the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently high
and the fraction of income that is earned early in life, θ, is suﬃciently high.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider the case where Φ ≥ 1. Here, we must consider
i’s expected willingness to remain married to j as j’s income uncertainty rises relative to
that of i’s. In this case, agent i has the binding reservation level of love. The eﬀect of a
change in Φ on the probability of divorce, conditional on the fact that they get married
WM
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where Φ + ρij > 0. The remainder of the proof follows that of Proposition 2, as the sign of
the eﬀect depends on the sign of the term in square brackets.
162.4.3 Spousal Mean-Income Diﬀerences and the Probability of Divorce
The discussion so far has not focused on income diﬀerences across spouses. Indeed, the
conditions which aﬀect the impact of mean-income diﬀerences on the probability of divorce
depend critically on the way in which divorce agreements split marital income. Since all
expected future labor income is shared once married in the model presented here, there
is no direct eﬀect of expected income diﬀerences on the probability of divorce and on the
threshold levels for the love shock, ˆ ν – see equations (13) and (14). However, diﬀerences in
mean income do have an indirect eﬀect on the probability of divorce since they will induce a
substitution eﬀect towards a higher initial level of love. If this love is permanent (δ is high),
then we should expect marriages with larger mean-income diﬀerences between partners to
have lower probabilities of divorce. This holds regardless of θ. If love is truly temporary
(δ = 0), however, then spousal mean-income diﬀerences will not help in predicting the
duration of marriages.
Proposition 4
• Case A: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual mean incomes will have
no eﬀect on the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently low.
• Case B: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual mean incomes will lower
the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently high.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider the case where yi ≥ yj, so that yi ≥ yij.
Individual i will be the binding individual with regards to whether or not to divorce. The
total eﬀect of an increase in i’s expected income relative to j’s is, conditional on the fact
that they marry so that WM
k ≥ WNM
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≤ 0. (28)
The sign depends on (1 − 2ψyij), which is assumed to always be positive. This is a direct
consequence of obtaining a solution with quadratic utility.
172.4.4 The Imperfect Sharing of Expected Future Resources in the Case of
Divorce
An important simplifying assumption for the theory is that all remaining expected perma-
nent income is shared if a married couple divorces in period 2. As a direct consequence,
Proposition 4 indicates that even when love is very temporary, a big diﬀerence in spouses’
expected future incomes (which suggests a great deal of initial love) is not a harbinger of
future divorce, unlike couples that are poor hedges for one another (Proposition 2), or that
have large diﬀerences in income volatility (Proposition 3). This feature of Proposition 4,
however, would not be the case if couples did not fully share their expected future incomes
in the case of divorce. Such a case is now discussed in this sub-section.
To focus on this issue alone, assume that couples only diﬀer in their mean incomes,
and that there is no income uncertainty. This simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed by the fact that
Propositions 2 − 5 already do not allow for any sharing of unexpected income changes
in the case of divorce, and the issue at hand is how the probability of divorce changes
if they do not share the expected part as well. While I maintain the assumption that
marital assets are shared at the time of divorce - namely, in the case of divorce, each
spouse receives shared marital savings from period one,
P
k=i,j sM
k - let χ be the fraction
of future permanent income remaining that an individual does not share with his / her
partner in the case of divorce; namely, the expected labor resources for individual i are
(1 − θ)(yij + χ(yi − yij)), while for individual j they are (1 − θ)(yij + χ(yj − yij)), which
simpliﬁes to (1 − θ)(yij − χ(yi − yij)). Continue to let individual i be the spouse that is
expected to be richer so that yi > yij, and hence i will have the binding reservation love
level in period 2:
ˆ ν = z(1 − b(x + z)) − φ − α1δ − α(1 − δ) (29)
where z = β−1(1−θ)χ(yi−yij) and x = β−1((1−θ)yi−(1/2)
P2
k=1 sM
k ). Of course, if χ = 0,
then z = 0 and we are back to the full sharing of expected permanent income as above.
18Following the earlier presentation, the probability of divorce is simply the probability that
the shock to mutual love falls below the threshold ˆ ν, namely P = F(ˆ ν). A key complication
introduced by relaxing the assumption of complete expected permanent income sharing
even in the case of divorce is that now the probability of divorce depends critically on
agent’s i’s and j’s consumption-savings decisions in period 1 through x0s interaction with
z in expression (29).
As the consumption welfare levels are unchanged if the couple never marries, to uncover
how unshared resources aﬀect our earlier results, we must only reconsider the case when i
and j marry in period 0 and then must optimally choose to stay married or divorce in period
2. To keep the algebra simple, assume that the shocks to love are uniformly distributed
over the interval [−∆,∆]. Repeating the maximization steps outlined earlier in the paper,
average savings at the end of period one is (1/2)
P
k=i,j sM
k = A·yij, where B = 1+bz2/2∆,
and A = (θ −β−1(1−θ)B)/(1+β−1B). Moreover, marital consumption in the ﬁrst period
is no longer equated across spouses as they have diﬀering expected resources in the second
period as long as the probability of divorce is greater than zero. The period one consumption
levels are:
cM
1i = Pz + β−1((1 − θ) + A)yij
cM
1j = −Pz − z2/2 + β−1((1 − θ) + A) · (1 + B)yij
where P = (1 + (ˆ ν/∆))/2 and ˆ ν is deﬁned in (29).14 The eﬀect of the lack of expected
income sharing in period two is smoothed through into consumption behavior in period 1.
To see this more clearly, consider the eﬀect of a small change in yi evaluated at yi = yij (i.e.










= (1/2)β−1P(1 − θ)χ. As long
as some income is earned in period 2, the probability of divorce is not zero, and there is
14Note that the eﬀects of z are not symmetric with respect to z for z > 0. While j will consume less to
smooth out the expected fewer resources he / she will have in period 2, due to the curvature in utility and
the fact that the reservation love shock is determined by individual i, the impacts of z on spouse i and j
will diﬀer.
19incomplete sharing of resources in period 2 in the case of divorce, spouse i consumes more
in period 1 than spouse j, as he/she has greater expected resources in period 2. Optimal
consumption in period 2 for the case that i and j remain married is:
cM
2i = cM
2j = β−1(A + (1 − θ))yij
In the case of divorce, the optimal consumption levels for i and j are, respectively:
cD
2i = β−1(A + (1 − θ))yij + z
cD
2j = β−1(A + (1 − θ))yij − z
Plugging these consumption values into the welfare functions for marriage and no marriage
as of period 1, expressions (2) and (4), respectively, an increase in yi aﬀects the probability









β−1χ(1 − θ) +

−(δ/2) + δP(ˆ ν)χ(1 − θ)





Note that if expected remaining income is completely shared even in the case of divorce,
χ → 0, then expression (30) collapses to expression (28). The ﬁrst term inside the braces
is the period 2 direct eﬀect of how a change in individual i’s expected income aﬀects the
probability of staying married: namely, (∂ˆ ν/∂yi). With incomplete sharing of expected
resources in the case of divorce, a rise in i’s expected resources will raise the net economic
beneﬁts to divorce in period 2 and hence should raise the probability of divorce.
The second term of expression (30) - in square brackets - is the eﬀect of a rise in i’s
expected resources on the probability of divorce that works indirectly through the decision
to get married. It is composed of two terms. The ﬁrst term within square brackets, as was
pointed out above for the case where χ = 0, indicates that as long as initial love has some
20persistence, then we should expect marriages with larger mean-income diﬀerences between
partners to have more love and hence should be less likely to end in divorce. The second
term within square brackets captures the eﬀect that the incomplete sharing of expected
resources in the case of divorce raises the economic returns to marriage for the better oﬀ
individual - recall that it’s their reservation level of love that is binding. Hence, ceteris
paribus, they can settle for a smaller amount of initial love as they still retain the option of
divorce. This raises the probability of divorce if initial love is persistent.
Of course, which eﬀect dominates cannot be determined a priori. However, the fraction
of expected income to be earned in the future, (1−θ), and the fraction of expected income
that is not shared in the case of divorce, χ, enter expression (30) together. Hence, both the
persistence of divorce, δ, and the expected amount of unshared lifetime resources in case
of a divorce, χ(1 − θ), factor prominently in the eﬀect of an increase in a couple’s mean
income diﬀerences on the probability of divorce.
Proposition 5
• Case A: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual mean incomes will have
no eﬀect on the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently low
and the expected amount of unshared lifetime resources, χ(1 − θ), is suﬃciently low.
• Case A∗: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual mean incomes will
raise the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently low and the
expected amount of unshared lifetime resources, χ(1 − θ), is suﬃciently high.
• Case B: An increase in the gap between a couple’s individual mean incomes will lower
the probability of divorce if the persistence of love, δ, is suﬃciently high and the
expected amount of unshared lifetime resources, χ(1 − θ), is suﬃciently low.
Proof: See expression (30).
Allowing for the possibility that divorced couples do not fully share expected future labor
income allows for a slightly richer set of possibilities for how the persistence of love can alter
the impact of joint economic characteristics on the probability of divorce. Nevertheless,
the basic proposition relating diﬀerences in expected income and its eﬀect on divorce is
21little changed. One can obtain a zero (positive) impact in Case A (Case A∗) from larger
expected income diﬀerences on the probability of divorce if initial love is temporary and
expected future resources are relatively similar (dissimilar) whether one stays married or
divorces. One can also obtain a negative impact of larger expected income diﬀerences on
the probability of divorce if love is permanent and expected future resources are relatively
similar whether one stays married or divorces (Case B).
3 Empirical Results
In this section I test the broad implications of the theory. Since potential pairings of
individuals are not observed in the data set, I am restricted to testing only the model’s im-
plications for couples that actually do get married. In particular, I investigate the impact of
joint spousal economic characteristics (E) – income correlations, their relative volatilities,
and mean diﬀerences – on the duration of marriages and hence on the probability of di-
vorce and the duration of marriage. If partners with higher correlated incomes and greater
diﬀerences in the volatilities of their incomes are less (more) likely to divorce, then we can
infer that love is primarily permanent (temporary), and the fraction of lifetime income
uncertainty that is to be resolved in the future is relatively small (large). Also, if partners
with larger diﬀerences in their mean incomes are less likely (no less likely) to divorce,
then we can infer that love is primarily permanent (temporary). This interpretation of
the empirical ﬁndings below is based on Propositions 2 - 4, subject to the qualiﬁcation in
Proposition 5; namely, that larger diﬀerences in mean incomes can lead to an increase in
the likelihood of divorce if love is temporary and couples incompletely share expected future
labor income in the case that they divorce.
Of course, the duration of a marriage will likely depend on a number of other observed
individual as well as joint non-economic characteristics. Hence, the duration of marriages
will be empirically modeled by a proportional hazards model, where the hazard rate is a
22function of these individual characteristics (I), joint non-economic characteristics (J) as well
as the joint economic characteristics (E) that are the ultimate source of this study.
It is critical to note that the model’s predictions concerning the likelihood of divorce and
the temporal persistence of love depend on the fact that these joint economic characteristics
are substituted for love at the time of marriage. Accordingly, these expected income char-
acteristics for each marriage should be based on information assumed to be known at the
beginning of each marriage. Unfortunately, however, these joint economic characteristics
(E) are measured only throughout the marriage. As such, using simple measures of these
characteristics in the duration equation may induce an endogeneity bias to the results. To
overcome this potential bias, I generate predicted values for these economic characteristics,
denoted b E, based only on data known at the beginning of the marriage. The variables used
for this purpose are individual characteristics (I) and joint non-economic characteristics (J)
that are also included in estimating the marriage duration model. Essential to using these
generated economic characteristics in our duration estimation is that I also identify some
variables (Z) that can predict the observed joint economic characteristics (E) but that do
not independently aﬀect the duration of marriage. The details of the identifying struc-
ture that I adopt, and the associated econometric issues, are discussed and investigated in
sub-sections 3.2 and 3.4.
3.1 The Data
The theory is tested using data on ﬁrst marriages from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1978-1994. As data for a respondent’s spouse are collected
only once he or she becomes married and no retrospective income data for the spouse are
collected, I can only consider married couples. The data set contains demographic, income,
and marital information for the respondents. It also contains a greatly reduced set of this
information for their spouses if applicable. The NLSY data set has over twelve thousand
23respondents; however, after removing missing data, incomplete responses, respondents who
became widowed or were never married, and making other data reﬁnements discussed below,
I have just over twelve hundred observations (ﬁrst marriages) left in the sample. Also, since
respondents can get married more than once, though the theory outlined above does not
incorporate this, I only consider data for ﬁrst marriages.15
The unit of observation for this model is a marriage. The key data for the dependent
variable in this empirical study is whether a marriage ends in divorce (DIV=1) or not.
For each marriage, the maximum duration observed of a given couples marriage is denoted
MAXDUR, which is equal to the uncensored duration of their marriage if the marriage ends
in divorce and is otherwise equal to the censored duration of their marriage in 1994 when
the sample ends.
For general demographic information used as explanatory variables, I include a number
of variables used in prior studies: namely, a dummy variable for whether the spouses at-
tended a two- or four-year college at the beginning of the marriage (EDM=1 for the male
and EDW=1 for the female), whether there were no dependents in the household at the
beginning of the marriage (NOKIDS=1), a dummy variable for whether a spouse was 25
years of age or older when ﬁrst married (AGEM=1 for the male and AGEF=1 for the fe-
male), the race of the respondent (WHITE=1), whether the respondent was raised Catholic
(CATH=1), and whether the respondent’s parents are divorced at the beginning of the
respondent’s marriage (PARDIV=1).16
The NLSY also provides information on each partner’s reported occupation at the time
of the marriage. Let MMAROCC be a vector of 10 dummy variables for the male partner’s
15Interestingly, a common ﬁnding in the literature is that individuals who have been divorced are more
likely to do so again if they remarry. I brieﬂy explore some empirical aspects of second marriages below at
the end of section 3.4 and the results in column (V) of Table 5B.
16The results are similar if I use the number of children at the beginning of marriage as opposed to a
dummy variable to distinguish between zero and the presence of children. Also, similar results were obtained
both when age was measured continuously and when multiple age dummies – under 21 , between 21 and
under 25, and then over 25 when ﬁrst married did not aﬀect the result.
24marital occupation, and FMAROCC be that for the female partner of each marriage.17 I
then cross multiplied these two 10×1 vectors of beginning of marriage occupation dummy
variables to obtain a 10 × 10 vector of cross marital occupation characteristics.
3.2 Construction of Economic Characteristics at the Start of a Marriage
From the NLSY, we can calculate for each marriage the mean, variance, and correlation
of the partner’s incomes.18 To insure that the marital-income characteristics are based on
available information at the time of the beginning of the marriage, the predicted income
characteristics for the marriage will be projected from those characteristics observed at
the beginning of a couple’s marriage. Consider ﬁrst the case of the constructed measure
of the predicted income correlation for each ith marriage. After calculating the partner’s
observed income correlation (CORRi), the predicted income correlation variable ( d CORRi)
was obtained from the ﬁtted value of the following linear regression of one element of E:
CORRi = A(Ii,Ji,Zi) + ui (31)
where A represents the linear coeﬃcients to be estimated.19 I represents a constant as well
as the following available individual characteristics
Ii = {AGEMi,AGEWi,EDMi,EDWi,CATHi,PARDIVi,NOKIDSi,MMAROCCi,FMAROCCi}.
17 The NLSY reports each partner’s current occupation which are then classiﬁed into 10 groupings. The
listed occupations on the NLSY are (001-195) [1] professional,technical and kindred, (201-245) [2] man-
agers,oﬃcials and proprietors, (260-285) [3] sales workers, (301-395) [4] clerical and kindred, (401-575) [5]
craftsmen, foremen and kindred, (601-715) [6] operatives and kindred, (740-785) [7] laborers, except farm,
(801-824) [8] farmers, farm managers, farm laborers and foreman, (901-965) [9] service workers, except pri-
vate household, and (980-984) [10] private household, where the occupational classiﬁcation codes are reported
in the parentheses, and my numbering is in square brackets. In a few instances, the respondent’s occupation
for the year of the marriage was not reported, so the occupation for the prior year was used.
18The data was converted to real by dividing by the 1994 based, chain weighted GDP deﬂator.
19Since the linear regressions all include the same right hand side variables, there is no eﬃciency gain from
jointly estimating them.
25J represents the avaiable non-economic cross spouse characteristics that are independent of
I, namely:
Ji = {AGEMi × AGEWi × EDMi × EDWi}.
Z represents the critical joint marital occupation variables that are linearly independent of
I and that can predict the joint economic characteristics (E) but that are assumed not to
directly aﬀect the duration of marriage
Zi = {MMAROCCi × FMAROCCi}.
The choice of cross marital occupation variables to identify the joint economic characteristics
is discussed below.20
To reiterate, the right-hand side variables of (31) are all known at the beginning of
the marriage. The ﬁtted values from this regression, d CORRi, are therefore the predicted
correlation of the partners’ incomes based on information at the beginning of the marriage.
Similarly, diﬀerences in the partners’ actual mean incomes (MGAP) and actual variances of
their incomes (V GAP) were regressed on the identical right-hand side variables that appear
in equation (31). From these regressions, the predicted gap in mean incomes ( d MGAP) and
variances ( d V GAP) were constructed. The mean income gap (MGAP) is measured as the
absolute value of the diﬀerence of the means as suggested by the deﬁnition of z in sub-
section 2.4.4. The income variance gap (VGAP) is measured by calculating the ratio of
the higher value in a marriage to the lower value in the marriage, as suggested by the
deﬁnition of Φ. Therefore, larger values of MGAP and V GAP correspond to greater mean
and variance inequality in a marriage, while the lowest value that MGAP and VGAP can
20Note that out of a possible 16 (2
4) combinations of of interactions of the sex speciﬁc age and education
dummy variables in J, 11 are linearly independent of the individual age and education dummy variables in
I. Out of a possible (10 × 10) combinations of of male and female marital occupations, 59 are both observed
in the sample and linearly independent of the individual marital occupation variables MMAROCC and
FMAROCC in I.
26take are 0 and 1, respectively.21 Hence, for each marriage, there is a vector of observed
joint economic characteristics E, and a vector of predicted joint economic characteristics,
b E, from the estimates of equation (31):
Ei = {CORRi,MGAPi,V GAPi} b Ei = { d CORRi, d MGAPi, d V GAPi}.
The estimates of equation (31) for the joint economic characteristics (E) are presented
in Table 2. The left-hand side column lists the explanatory variables, while columns (I)
through (III) present the results for the three dependent variables. To conserve space, the
individual estimates and standard errors are not reported for the 18 linearly independent
individual marital occupational dummies (contained in I) in each regression, for the remain-
ing independent 59 cross spouse martial occupation dummies (Z), or for the 9 joint non-
economic characteristics (J). Rather, I report a number of p-values for F-tests that test for
the signiﬁcance of relevant variables in the speciﬁcation (31). In particular, p-value(CROSS
OCC [59]) tests whether the coeﬃcients on the linearly independent marital occupation
interaction terms in Z are jointly equal to zero. This p-value statistic for the signiﬁcance of
the cross spouse occupation variables will be useful for identifying the independent role of
the predicted income characteristics on the duration of marriage.
Column (I) of Table 2 presents the regression results when the couple’s actual labor
income correlation (CORRi) is the dependent variable. Typically, couples in which the
respondent is white, who are older when married and who start their marriage without chil-
dren at the start of the marriage have more negatively correlated labor incomes. The p-value
results from the F-statistic also reveal that one can reject the hypothesis that the individual
and cross marital occupational dummy variables are jointly equal to zero at or below the








i ). Other approaches to empirically
deﬁning the disparity of means and variances across partners were used, such as the absolute value of the
diﬀerence or the absolute value of the diﬀerence scaled by the sum of the two partners’ variables. The
ﬁndings of this paper do not depend on the method chosen to measure these disparities, but rather the
measures presented are those that most closely ﬁt their counterparts from the theory.
27.001 level of statistical signiﬁcance. As well, the p-values for the individual and cross age
and education variables are also below conventional levels for statistical signiﬁcance.
Column (II) of Table 2 reports the empirical results for equation (31) when MGAPi is
the dependent variable. Marriages in which the respondent is white, Catholic, and with
divorced parents, and in which the female spouse has not attended college are associated
with larger mean income gaps. These eﬀects all have levels of statistical signiﬁcance below
the .10 level. In addition, the reported p-value reveals that one can reject the hypothesis that
the coeﬃcients on the individual and cross spouse marital occupational variables are jointly
equal to zero at or below the .01 level of statistical signiﬁcance. Also, the p-values for the
coeﬃcients on the individual age and education variables are also below conventional levels
of statistical signiﬁcance. Finally, column (III) presents the results for the case in which the
partners’ gap in the variances of their individual incomes, V GAPi is the dependent variable.
Here, only the coeﬃcients on the variables for the individual and cross spouse occupation
dummies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at or below the .01 level. The R-squared is
.274, which is two times higher than for the CORRi equation (I) and about one-half higher
than for the MGAP equation (II).22
3.3 Empirical Regularities
Tables 3 and 4 present statistics and correlations for the data for the marriages and marital
economic characteristics used in this study. Table 3 demonstrates that about thirty percent
of ﬁrst marriages failed by 1994, while only ﬁfteen percent of the respondents’ parents
divorced. The sample is over sixty-ﬁve percent white, over thirty-ﬁve percent Catholic,
and quite young when ﬁrst married. These latter two features are likely driven by data
22Fortunately, the regression results for MGAP are no weaker than that for CORR, as one potential ﬁnding
is that d MGAP is insigniﬁcant in determining marital durations. Of course, a poorly measured d MGAP is
one way to obtain this ﬁnding. However, since the R-squared for the MGAP regression is no worse than
that for CORR, it is unlikely that a ﬁnding of the insigniﬁcance of d MGAP on the duration of marriages
(and the signiﬁcance of d PCORR on the duration of marriages) would be due to its poor measurement. I
return to this point again below.
28necessity: since the survey is of young people, and I consider only those who get married
during this sample, this sample criteria biases the population towards those who married
young, a characteristic that could in fact be correlated with being raised Catholic.23 Finally,
approximately thirty percent of the male and female spouses have attended a two- or four-
year college at some point by the time of their marriage, and approximately eighty percent
of these ﬁrst marriages begin without dependents. The average predicted correlation (based
on data at the initial year of their marriage) is around .2, the average mean income gap is
approximately twelve thousand dollars, while the average ratio of the highest-to-the-lowest
income variances is approximately 19.24,25
Table 4 presents a simple cross correlation of the data. The correlations reveal that
subsequent divorce is negatively correlated with age at marriage , the absence of dependents
at the beginning of marriage, more education, and parents who did not divorce. In general,
the unconditional correlations between divorce and the predicted income characteristics for
correlation and volatility are positive and relatively large, while the predicted mean gap has
a much smaller and negative correlation with divorce. In addition, there are two other sets
of correlations that are of interest: ﬁrst, marriages that begin when either the male or female
spouse is older are associated with the respondent being more educated, though for women
it is associated with having fewer beginning of marriage dependents. Finally, the predicted
income characteristics display the following correlation patterns: ﬁrst, spouses with larger
gaps in their mean incomes tend to have more negatively correlated incomes and smaller
gaps in their income variances. Second, spouses with higher predicted income correlations
also have larger predicted volatility diﬀerences. The remaining correlations between the
23While this may bias the sample, it is unlikely that this biases the tests of the hypotheses.
24Note that the lowest value for V GAPi is 1, although the predicted value can take a value lower as the
regression speciﬁcation (31) is unrestricted. The results reported in Table 5 are robust to setting these
predicted values below one equal to one.
25While the predicted correlation is low, this is consistent with the ﬁnding of Dynarski and Gruber (1997).
Using the PSID and CEX data sets, they ﬁnd that a wife’s labor income does not appreciably aﬀect the
smoothness of the head’s labor income. However, as long as the correlation between the head’s and wife’s
incomes is less than one, marriage will still provide a consumption-insurance beneﬁt.
29income variables and the other characteristics are directly related to the empirical results
in Table 2, from which these predicted income characteristics were constructed.
3.4 Empirical Estimates
This subsection presents tests of the predictions in Propositions 2 − 5. The empirical
analysis of marriages and divorces in this data set is complicated by the fact that the data
are censored: the data set ends with some marriages having failed after surviving for some
duration of time and other marriages having survived until the end of the recorded data
set. Fortunately, duration models are able to test the predictions from the theory while
overcoming this problem of censoring. Duration models specify a hazard function, λ(ti,Xi)
and a survival function S(ti,Xi): the former is the instantaneous probability that the ith
marriage of duration of t periods will fail. The Xi are exogenous and time-invariant variables
that impact the hazard of the ith marriage ending in a divorce: namely, Xi = {Ii,Ji, b Ei}.
Clearly, λ(ti,Xi) and S(ti,Xi) are related.26
The estimation results presented below were obtained from a Cox (1972) proportional
hazard model.27 For the proportional hazard model, the hazard function is related to
the hazard rate according to λ(ti,Xi) = λ(ti,0)eγ0(Xi), where the vector γ contains the
parameters to be estimated. The beneﬁt to estimating the proportional hazards model
is that one can use a partial likelihood function approach to estimate the parameters γ,
without estimating the baseline hazard λ(ti,0) which contains the individual heterogeneity.
To test the predictions of the theory, γ0Xi is speciﬁed as follows:
γ0Xi = γ1 · d CORRi + γ2 · d MGAPi + γ3 · d V GAPi + γ4 · Ii + γ5 · Ji (32)
26See Kiefer (1988) for an introductory discussion of duration models.
27Also see Keifer (1988) for the speciﬁcs of the partial likelihood function approach to estimating these
models with censoring. Note that this assumption for the hazard function does not aﬀect the results presented
below. Similar ﬁndings were also obtained from exponential, Weibull and log-logistic speciﬁcations of the
hazard function.
30According to the theory, the estimates of γ1, γ2 and γ3 should be negative if love is per-
manent and future income (both shared and unshared) is relatively unimportant in income
considerations. In contrast, if love is temporary and future income is important in per-
manent income considerations, then γ1 and γ3 should be positive. In addition, if love is
temporary then γ2 should be zero (positive) if expected future income diﬀerentials in the
case of divorce are small (large). Again, Ii and Ji are individual characteristics as well as
non-economic joint characteristics used to represent the observed heterogeneity in marital
durations. To conserve space, rather than report the estimated coeﬃcients on the individual
marital occupation dummy variables and the interacted gender speciﬁc age and education
dummy variables, I simply report at the bottom of the table the p-values from the χ2 test
of the null hypothesis that the individual industry, age and education, and cross spouse age
and education variables.28
As pointed out above, the use of predicted joint economic characteristics ( b E) at the
start of the marriage in the duration model is meant to overcome a potential endogeneity
bias from using the actual joint economic characteristics observed throughout the marriage.
Essential to using these generated economic characteristics in our duration estimation is
that we identify some variables (Z) that can predict the observed joint economic charac-
teristics (E) but that do not directly aﬀect the duration of marriage. The variables used
in this paper for this purpose are joint spouse occupation dummy variables based on each
partner’s occupation at the beginning of the marriage. There are two major reasons why
these variables were selected for this purpose. First, these combined occupation dummy
variables, MMAROCC × WMAROCC, would be expected to be important predictors of
a marriage’s joint economic characteristics, E, throughout the marriage as long as incomes
are subject to occupation speciﬁc shocks. Indeed, I demonstrated exactly this point in Ta-
28Though not shown, I experimented with allowing for time dependent covariates for each of these indi-
vidual characteristics (not shown) in the hazard model. I found that none were statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at below .1 level.
31ble 2; namely, these joint marital occupation dummy variables have signiﬁcant explanatory
power in predicting the joint economic characteristics.
Second, it is not likely that joint marital occupation variables will have a signiﬁcant
remaining eﬀect on the duration speciﬁcation, equation (32) outside of their eﬀect on the
key joint economic characteristics for two key reasons. First, the duration equation it-
self includes each partner’s individual marital occupation dummy variable in Ii. Second,
the duration equation already contains variables in Ii and Ji individual as well as joint
non-economic characteristics which are likely to be important determinants of the observed
heterogeneity in both marital duration and joint economic characteristics. Hence, based on
these two reasons, it is unlikely that the key ﬁndings below are due to the omission of vari-
ables, such as those in Z, from the duration speciﬁcation. However, to guard further against
the possibility that these cross spouse industry variables embody relevant unobserved cross
spouse heterogeneity that is relevant for marital duration independent of their inﬂuence on
the joint economic characteristics, in columns (I)-(III) of Table 5B I provide a number of
modiﬁcations to the basic speciﬁcation to test the sturdiness of this identiﬁcation.
The use of generated economic characteristics, b E, also introduces a few econometric
wrinkles into the estimation procedure. First, as these regressors in the duration equation
have been generated from an earlier estimation step, the standard errors in the duration
equation (i.e. the second step) must be corrected for the sampling error inherited from
the imputed regressors. To correct these standard errors, I followed Murphy and Topel
(1985) by calculating the analytical and numerical ﬁrst derivatives of the likelihood functions
from the OLS regressions of the predictions equations (31) and the duration model implied
by equation (32), calculated the cross partials of the joint likelihood functions, and then
inverted the joint matrix to obtain the standard errors for the duration equation.29 The
29Two things should be noted. First, since both steps of the regression use the same data sample, the full
covariance matrix must be evaluated. See section 5.1 of Murphy and Topel (1985) for the formulas for the
relevant matrix calculations. Second, the results for the ﬁrst step would also be aﬀected but are not reported
again as they are not the focal point of inquiry in this study. The size of the full estimated covariance matrix
32results throughout the remainder of the paper use this corrected variance-covariance matrix
of the estimated parameters for statistical inference.
In addition, while the use of the generated regressors was predicated on the belief that
using data throughout the marriage for the economic characteristics would be subject to
endogeneity bias, such a bias can be examined using a Hausman (1978) test. Under the
null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias, including the observed economic char-
acteristics E rather than the generated ones b E should produce estimates of the impact of
the economic characteristics on the duration of marriage that should be the same. Impor-
tantly, however, it would also be the case that the one step estimate using the observed
joint economic characteristics data should be more eﬃciently estimated under the null than
the estimate obtained using generated regressors from the two step process. Both would,
however, produce consistent estimates under the null. Rejection of this test of the equality
of the coeﬃcients would indicate an endogeneity bias, placing further importance on our
use of data at the beginning of the marriage as important instruments in understanding the
eﬀect of joint economic characteristics on the duration of marriage, as well as uncovering
the temporal nature of initial marital love. The row in Tables 5A and 5B labeled ‘Hausman’
presents results from such a test: namely, whether the coeﬃcients on the joint economic
characteristics signiﬁcantly diﬀer when one replaces the observed characteristics with the
predicted ones.30
Table 5A presents estimation results of equation (32) for the full sample. In general,
the results support the view that love is temporary, that the fraction of income risk in the
future is relatively large, and that incomplete sharing of expected future income is not large.
Typically, we can reject the null hypothesis that the estimates of γ1 and γ3 are 0 in favor
is 232 × 232, where 232 reﬂects the 98 coeﬃcients in each of the three equations for constructing ˆ E, and
the 38 coeﬃcients in the duration equation.
30Each model is re-estimated - generally not shown except in column (IV) of Table 5A - using the observed
characteristic(s), E, rather than the generated one(s), b E. The standard Hausman test is then constructed
for the equality of the coeﬃcients on economic characteristics γ1, γ2, and-or γ3 across the two estimated
speciﬁcations.
33of the alternative that they are greater than 0. Furthermore, the estimates of γ2 are always
statistically indistinguishable from 0.
For example, Column (I) of Table 5A provides estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation
(32) when only d CORR is included in b E in the regression. Strikingly, the more positively
related the spouses’ incomes are, the more likely that the marriage will end in divorce as
the hazard rate rises. The coeﬃcient on γ1 is positive and statistically diﬀerent from 0 at
below the .01 level of signiﬁcance. Columns (II) and (III) provide estimates of the baseline
speciﬁcation (32) when just d MGAP and d V GAP, respectively, are included as covariates in
the hazard function. While the coeﬃcient on d MGAP is not statistically diﬀerent from 0,
the coeﬃcient on d V GAP is statistically signiﬁcant at or below the .01 level, and the sign
of the coeﬃcient is once again positive. This suggests that partners with greater diﬀerence
in their predicted income volatilities will have an increased chance of divorce, while those
with greater mean diﬀerences will not. The estimates in columns (I) through (III) also
suggest that those respondents whose parents have divorced have a higher chance of divorce
themselves, while the results in columns (II) and (III) suggest that starting a marriage
without children lowers the probability of divorce. As well, for these latter two cases, one
can reject that the individual marital occupation dummy variables for both spouses are
jointly equal to zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
In column (V) of Table 5A, estimates are provided when all three economic variables
are included simultaneously. Again, the coeﬃcients on d CORR and d V GAP are positive and
statistically diﬀerent from 0 at or below the .05 levels of statistical signiﬁcance. Moreover,
the coeﬃcient on d MGAP remains statistically indistinguishable from 0 at conventional
levels. Interestingly, the results in Table 2 provide evidence that the predicted level of mean
incomes has a much better ﬁtting regression than does the predicted income correlation as
measured by its R-squared. It is likely, therefore, the ﬁnding that γ2 is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 is not due to d MGAP’s poor measurement, but rather to d MGAP’s inability
34to contribute to the explanation of a marriage’s duration.
To better aid the reader in understanding the the role of the predicted economic charac-
teristics, in column (IV) I present estimates of the duration model using the observed joint
economic characteristics, E, rather than predicted ones, b E. Note that a similar pattern
of coeﬃcients and statistical signiﬁcance is found whether using the observed or predicted
characteristics. However, the estimated coeﬃcients in column (V) using the predicted char-
acteristics are much larger in magnitude, as are their estimated standard errors. With the
exception of the results in column (II) - where the estimated coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero - the p-value for the Hausman test rejects the equality of the coeﬃ-
cients. Such a ﬁnding places additional importance to having created the key economic
characteristics from data known at the beginning of the marriage.
Table 5B provides additional empirical results which demonstrate the robustness of the
ﬁndings. In particular, the results in columns (I) - (III) investigate the extent to includ-
ing cross marital occupation dummy variables (ZI) only in the economic characteristics
prediction equation, (31), but not in the duration equation (32), while allowing individual
martial occupations in both equations prejudices the ﬁndings. Column (I) presents results
from the baseline speciﬁcation where I exclude the 18 individual marital occupation vari-
ables from the duration equation. The results for d CORR, d MGAP and d V GAP are little
changed. The coeﬃcient on d CORR is a little lower, while that for d V GAP is a little higher.
Moreover, the coeﬃcient on the female education variable is now signiﬁcant at below the
.1 level. A second modiﬁcation, presented in column (II), explores whether partners with
the same marital occupation marry because of some common interest or ‘love’ which may
independently aﬀect the duration of marriage.31 To this end, I re-estimate the marriage
duration equation and include an additional dummy variable for whether spouses having
the identical marital occupation (JOINT=1). The results indicate, however, that such a
31Though not reported, spouses with identical marital occupations have signiﬁcantly higher actual as well
as predicted income correlations, though reduced mean and variance diﬀerences.
35positive attraction between partners with the same marital occupation does not have a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the duration of the marriage. Moreover, the estimated pattern
of the response of the duration of marriage to the predicted joint economic characteristics
is unchanged.
Another modiﬁcation, presented in column (III), is to see whether including a number
of cross spouse marital occupations into the marital duration speciﬁcation aﬀects the key
results. This was undertaken in the following steps. First, I conducted individual Lagrange
multiplier tests - not shown - to see if any of the possible 78 observed combinations of cross
spouse occupation dummies might potentially be omitted from the baseline speciﬁcation
(32) based on a .1 signiﬁcance threshold. I found that 5 such variables passed this criteria. I
then re-estimated the baseline speciﬁcation where all these potentially omitted joint marital
occupation variables were also included as additional variables in the duration model.32 The
results, presented in column (III), indicate that such a modiﬁcations does not change the
estimated pattern of the response of the duration of marriage to the predicted joint economic
characteristics, ˆ E. Together, the ﬁndings in columns (I)-(III) demonstrate the robustness
of using the full set of joint cross marital occupation codes to identify the impact of joint
economic characteristics in the marital duration equation.
The results in columns (IV) and (V) of Table 5B are presented to ensure further that
our baseline sample and speciﬁcation are not unduly inﬂuenced by households that may
display reverse causality with respect to economic characteristics and marital success.33
For example, suppose that households have some private information that one of them will
be very successful in market activity; hence, one partner specializes in home production
(where economic services are unreported) for the purposes of having children. We would
32Of course, by picking a size of 10 percent for false rejections, 5 out of 78 rejections of the null is quite
unremarkable. These marital combinations are (male-female): 1-7, 2-6, 5-2, 6-4, 6-8. See footnote 17 for the
occupational numberings.
33Of course, this is the exactly reason why the predicted values of CORR, MGAP, and VGAP, rather than
their actual values, are included in the speciﬁcation of the hazard rate, equation (32).
36expect that couples like this would display a larger gap in mean observed incomes, and
more negatively correlated observed incomes.34 The results in columns (IV) and (V) remove
marriages whose partners have the bottom quintile of observed mean income correlations,
CORRi, and the highest gap in mean incomes, MGAPi, respectively, in the sample.35 The
results for γ1, γ2, and γ3 reported in column (V I), however, are unaﬀected by the removal
of these households. Finally, in (VII), households with the lowest 25 percent of observed
income correlations (CORR) are removed from the sample. Again, the results on the key
variables are largely unaﬀected.
As a ﬁnal investigation, I included second marriages into the data set and re-estimated
the projection equations (not shown) and proportional hazard model equation, including a
dummy variable for second marriages (SECOND) as an additional explanatory variable in
both equations. Note that these 125 second marriages come from the 353 out of 1207 ﬁrst
marriages that ended in divorce, though any dependence is not modeled in the econometrics.
The results from estimated hazard model are reported in column (V) of Table 5B. One would
think, however, that second marriages for the respondent might involve some learning, which
would lead them to make better matches during second marriages. The evidence indicates,
however, the inclusion of these additional marriages leaves the baseline estimation results
relatively unchanged, though there is a statistically signiﬁcant increased hazard for second
marriages as compared to ﬁrst ones.36 While puzzling, the myopia or addictive behavior
towards temporary initial love suggested by these results for second marriages is outside
the scope of the paper.37
34The scenario for the latter would be that a successfully married couple would have one partner with
improving income prospects while the other partner would have declining market participation in order to
raise children. In turn, this would make their actual income correlations (CORR) appear negative.
35To note, the ﬁndings are also identical if I remove the top quintile of actual income variance diﬀerentials,
VGAP, in the samples, or impose a minimum average earnings restriction for each partner.
36I also tried interacting second marriages with the economic characteristics, though the coeﬃcients were
individually and jointly insigniﬁcant as conventional levels.
37Interestingly, second marriages have, on average, lower predicted income correlations than ﬁrst marriages
that end in divorce. This is important, since these second marriages are a sub-sample of ﬁrst marriages that
end in divorce. Hence, there seems to be some learning going on here. As well, second marriages have, on
37To summarize, Tables 5A and 5B present comprehensive evidence that income charac-
teristics projected from data available only at the beginning of a marriage are signiﬁcant
explanatory factors in a marriage’s probability of survival. The evidence uncovered is that
more positively correlated incomes between partners and a bigger gap in their income volatil-
ities are associated with marriages of decreased duration. Moreover, bigger mean income
gaps do not aﬀect a marriage’s duration. This pattern of results is consistent with the
marriage model presented in the ﬁrst part of the paper in which love is temporary, the
fraction of income uncertainty that lies in the future is large, while the fraction of expected
unshared income in the case of divorce is small.38
4 Conclusion
This paper has explored a model in which individuals can borrow or lend through time but
can only diversify their labor income risk via marriage. Furthermore, the model allows for
an exogenous, ﬂuctuating factor that is a substitute for the utility from consumption: i.e.,
love. The model predicts that if love is permanent and income risk diminishes through time,
then couples who substitute away from the hedging role of marriage when ﬁnding a partner
will in fact be less likely to subsequently divorce. Alternatively, if love is quite temporary
and income risk looms large in the future, then these same couples who substitute away
from the hedging role of marriage when ﬁnding a partner will in fact be more likely to
subsequently divorce. The evidence provided in this paper points to the likelihood that
love is temporary and that future income uncertainty is important in determining marital
average, lower predicted diﬀerences in income volatility than do ﬁrst marriages that end in divorce. Again,
there seems to be some learning going on here. Nevertheless, consistent with the literature on divorce,
second marriages are more likely to fail than ﬁrst marriages. Of the 1207 ﬁrst marriages, 29 % (353/1207)
fail in divorce, whereas of the 125 second marriages from these 353 failed marriages, 35 % (44/125) fail in
divorce, ceteris paribus. Given the shorter observed time horizon in the data for second marriages, this
higher frequency of divorce in second marriages in the table is likely to be biased downwards.
38The result on income uncertainty might be quite large given that the data set, the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, focuses on young respondents. That is why the evidence for d MGAP is important for
establishing the case of love’s temporary nature.
38duration. Further testable implications based on the mean and variance diﬀerences between
spouses and the way in which the persistence properties of love determine how these predict
marital duration also conﬁrm the ﬁnding that love is temporary.
A potential shortcoming of this model is that love is purely determined by exogenous
factors.39 Rather, if partners could invest in love (perhaps with home production) to raise
its future stock, then they may ﬁnd that better economic characteristics would lead to a
higher return on the investment in love. In turn, this would lead to partners with better
economic characteristics accumulating a greater stock of love, which would make these
marriages last longer. An extension along these lines, however, does not alter the basic
ﬁnding that beneﬁcial economic characteristics (e.g., marrying a better hedge) lead to an
increase in the survival of marriages and that initial love cannot simply be substituted in
its place.
39See Mulligan (1997) and Becker and Murhpy (1998), among others, for a more general treatment of the
economic and welfare eﬀects of endogenizing love.
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41Table 1. Timing of Events
1. Period 0
(a) Individuals i and j meet.
(b) They learn how much they initially love each other, α1, the expected correlation
of their period-1 incomes, ρij, and the variance of their incomes, σ2
i and σ2
j.
(c) They decide whether or not to marry.
2. Period 1
(a) Each individual k = i,j receives his or her ﬁrst-period income, θ(yk + 1k).
(b) Individuals consume cM
1k (save sM) if married and cNM
1k (save sNM) if never
married.
3. Period 2
(a) Married individuals learn how much they still love each other, α2 = (1 − δ)α +
δα1 + ν.
(b) Individuals who were married in period 0 decide to divorce or remain married.
(c) Each individual k = i,j receives his or her second-period income, which has a
present value as of time period 1 equal to β−1(1−θ)(yk+2k). If couples divorce,
they pay the utility cost φ.
(d) Divorced individuals consume cD
2k. Married individuals consume cM
2k . Never
married individuals consume cNM
2k .
42Table 2: Economic Variables Projected on Initial Marital Characteristics
Dependent Variable
(I) (II) (III)
Explanatory Variables CORR MGAP VGAP
Constant 0.186 8.359∗∗∗ 0.250
(0.403) (1.052) (0.173)
AGEM −0.103∗∗ 0.532 0.030
(0.052) (0.965) (0.125)
AGEW −0.178∗∗ −1.941 1.722
(0.081) (1.413) (1.331)
EDM −0.035 1.845 0.001
(0.054) (1.239) (0.097)
EDW −0.022 − 2.483∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.048) (0.961) (0.096)
WHITE − 0.123∗∗∗ 3.107∗∗∗ 0.101
(0.033) (0.677) (0.070)
NOKIDS − 0.098∗∗∗ 0.560 −0.173
(0.037) (0.793) (0.168)
CATHOLIC −0.005 1.736∗∗ 0.010
(0.032) (0.708) (0.056)
PARDIV 0.002 1.567∗ −0.066
(0.041) (0.890) (0.054)
NOBS 1207 1207 1207
NR 98 98 98
R2 .123 .177 .274
p-value(OCC[18]) .001 .006 .001
p-value(AGE[12]) .007 .036 .685
p-value(ED [12]) .031 .001 .641
p-value(CROSS OCC [59]) .001 .001 .001
p-value (CROSS AGE & ED [9]) .029 .131 .482
Notes: Columns (I)-(III) report the estimation results for the full sample, 1207 observations, where
partner’s income correlations (CORR), income mean gaps (MGAP) and income variance gaps
(VGAP) are the dependent variables, respectively. NOBS is the number of observations (mar-
riages), and NR is the number of regressors. Standard errors, robust to possible heteroskedasticity
of unknown form, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ refer to statistical signiﬁcance (two-
tailed) at or below the .01, 05 and .10 levels, respectively. p-value (OCC[18]) tests whether the
coeﬃcients on MMAROCC and FMAROCC in I are jointly equal to zero; p-value (AGE[12]) tests
whether the coeﬃcients on all the age variables in I and J are jointly equal to zero; p-value (ED[12])
tests whether the coeﬃcients on all the education variables in I and J are jointly equal to zero;
p-value (Cross AGE & ED [9]) tests whether the coeﬃcients on the linearly independent age and
education interactions terms in J are jointly equal to zero; p-value(CROSS OCC [59]) tests whether
the coeﬃcients on the linearly independent interaction terms in MMAROCC and FMAROCC in Z
are jointly equal to zero; The number of restrictions for each test are reported in square brackets.
The variables are: whether the respondent was white (WHITE), the partners’ ages when married
(AGEF=1 for the female and AGEM=1 for the male if 25 or older), did the partners’ attend a 2
or 4 year college (EDF=1 for the female and EDM=1 for the male), were the respondent’s parents
divorced (PARDIV=1), and was the respondent raised Catholic (CATH=1).
43Table 3: Statistics
Percentile
Series Mean Std. Error 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
DIV 0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
MAXDUR 9.815 4.157 3.000 9.000 10.000 13.000 15.000
WHITE 0.671 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AGEM 0.309 0.462 0.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AGEF 0.152 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
EDM 0.276 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
EDF 0.259 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
NOKIDS 0.760 0.426 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CATH 0.380 0.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
PARDIV 0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
d CORR 0.216 0.183 0.003 0.112 0.216 0.316 0.414
d MGAP 12.692 4.922 7.346 9.575 12.317 14.993 18.121
d V GAP 19.021 11.179 −6.846 0.410 6.252 14.405 24.506
Notes: See Table 2. Number of observations is 1207. Variables that are new to the tables are
whether the marriage ended in an observed divorce (DIV) and the whether the respondent
had children at the end of the marriage or sample (KIDS). d CORR, d MGAP and d V GAP are





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Table 5A: Estimation Results for the Divorce Hazard Rate (λ)
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV ) (V )








d V GAP · 100 0.109∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.022)
V GAP · 100 0.037∗∗∗
(0.013)
AGEM 0.104 −0.017 −0.028 −0.014 0.085
(0.187) (0.156) (0.126) (0.157) (0.204)
AGEW 0.138 −0.087 −0.229 −0.137 −0.053
(0.333) (0.309) (0.205) (0.306) (0.257)
EDM −0.173 −0.185 −0.201 −0.223 −0.153
(0.173) (0.177) (0.181) (0.173) (0.182)
EDW −0.243 −0.325∗∗ −0.253 −0.297∗∗ −0.250
(0.178) (0.158) (0.146) (0.147) (0.158)
WHITE −0.021 −0.107 −0.212∗∗ −0.147 −0.068
(0.123) (0.129) (0.090) (0.105) (0.128)
CATHOLIC −0.115 −0.066 −0.088 −0.087 −0.086
(0.114) (0.125) (0.112) (0.110) (0.130)
PARDIV 0.260∗ 0.276∗ 0.252∗ 0.244∗ 0.279∗
(0.140) (0.144) (0.135) (0.135) (0.153)
NOKIDS −0.128 −0.253∗∗ −0.193∗∗ −0.220∗∗ −0.112
(0.124) (0.124) (0.096) (0.113) (0.148)
NOBS 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207
NR 36 36 36 38 38
EXITS 353 353 353 353 353
llk −2383.37 −2387.87 −2383.87 −2380.87 −2381.22
p − value(OCC[18]) .139 .002 .022 0.005 0.013
p − value(AGE[12]) .339 .696 .607 0.581 0.567
p − value(ED[12]) .080 .178 .243 0.031 0.217
p − value(CROSSAGE&ED[9]) .608 .779 .587 0.623 0.607
p − value(Hausman[†]) .019 .441 .001 −− 0.002
Notes: See Tables 2 and 3. Estimates are obtained from a proportional hazard model. Columns (I)-
(III) and (V) report the estimation results for the full sample using the two-step estimation procedure
where the predicted joint economic characteristics from Table 2 are used. The standard errors for
these cases are corrected for generated regressor bias following Murphy and Topel (1985). The
results in column (IV) are for the 1-step estimator where the realized joint economic characteristics
are used as explanatory variables. llk is the value of the log-likelihood function, and Exits is the
number of realized divorces in the sample. EXITS is the number of uncensored data observations,
namely those that end in divorce. p-value(Hausman) is from a Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test of
whether the joint economic characteristics, CORR, MGAP and VGAP are endogenous. † indicates
that the number of restrictions tested is 1 for columns (I)-(III) and 3 for column (V).
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V ariable (I) (II) (III) (IV ) (V ) (V I)
d CORR 0.687∗∗ 0.949∗∗ 0.829∗ 1.521∗∗ 1.055∗∗ 0.934∗
(0.349) (0.475) (0.498) (0.694) (0.495) (0.544)
d MGAP −0.009 −0.008 −0.021 −0.008 −0.004 0.004
(0.015) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.045) (0.022)
d V GAP · 100 0.114∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗





AGEM 0.056 0.088 0.068 −0.218 0.219 −0.009
(0.184) (0.207) (0.210) (0.208) (0.194) (0.159)
AGEW −0.297 −0.039 −0.169 −0.071 0.183 −0.164
(0.237) (0.249) (0.239) (0.265) (0.175) (0.215)
EDM −0.164 −0.152 −0.144 −0.193 −0.044 −0.198
(0.198) (0.166) (0.185) (0.183) (0.218) (0.173)
EDW −0.311∗ −0.243 − 0.274∗ −0.515∗∗ −0.357∗ −0.247∗
(0.176) (0.179) (0.149) (0.232) (0.184) (0.149)
WHITE −0.116 −0.069 −0.044 0.004 −0.107 −0.150∗∗
(0.121) (0.127) (0.139) (0.153) (0.135) (0.089)
CATHOLIC −0.070 −0.090 −0.079 0.193 −0.101 −0.062
(0.125) (0.128) (0.121) (0.192) (0.134) (0.123)
PARDIV 0.305∗∗ 0.276∗ 0.299∗∗ −0.239 0.241 0.242∗
(0.155) (0.148) (0.150) (0.174) (0.165) (0.139)
NOKIDS −0.125 −0.112 −0.099 −0.129 −0.052 −0.086
(0.127) (0.140) (.135) (0.426) (0.130) (0.124)
NOBS 1207 1207 1207 966 966 1332
NR 20 39 43 38 38 39
EXITS 353 353 353 291 296 397
llk −2396.72 −2381.17 −2372.57 −1896.02 −1926.99 −2723.94
p − value(OCC[18]) −− .013 .021 .072 .003 .078
p − value(AGE[12]) .570 .571 .583 .563 .545 .637
p − value(ED[12]) .156 .221 .216 .065 .039 .337
p − value(CROSSAGE&ED[9]) .641 .608 .681 .462 .206 .525
p − value(Hausman[3]) .001 .006 .001 .048 .001 .001
Notes: See Table 5A. The standard errors for these cases are corrected for generated regressor
bias following Murphy and Topel (1985). The estimation results all use the two-step estimation
procedure where the predicted joint economic characteristics from Table 2 are used. The results in
column (I) are for the case where the individual marital occupation dummy variables are excluded
from the speciﬁcation. The results in column (II) include both the individual marital occupations
and a dummy variable (JOINT) that takes the value one if both spouses have the same marital
occupations. The results in column (III) include both the individual marital occupations and 5
dummy variables for the joint marital occupations that were signiﬁcant at below the .1 level based
on a Lagrange Multiplier test when they were individually included in the speciﬁcation. The results
in column (IV) are for the sub-sample where the bottom quintile of actual income correlations are
removed from the sample. The results in column (V) are for the sub-sample where the top quintile
of mean income gaps (MGAPs) are removed from the sample. The results in column (VI) are for
the expanded sample that includes second marriages.
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